UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-2-2013

Valadez-Pacheco v. State Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt.
40386

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Valadez-Pacheco v. State Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 40386" (2013). Not Reported. 1120.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1120

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JUAN CARLOS VALADEZ-PACHECO,

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

S. Ct. No. 40386
Elmore Co. Case CV-2011-1044

)
)

Respondent.

)

----------- )

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State ofldaho
In and For the County of Elmore

HONORABLE LYNN NORTON
Presiding Judge

Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY
&BARTLETT
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

Lawrence Wasden
IDA! IO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Table of Authorities

II.

Statement of the Case .................................................... 1

....................................................

111

A.

Nature of the Case ................................................. 1

B.

General Course of Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings ................................ 1

2.

Post-conviction proceedings ................................... 6

III.

Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................ 8

IV.

Argument
A.

B.

............................................................. 8

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Declining to Consider the Police and
Forensic Reports Attached to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's Initial and Amended
Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief ................................... 8
1.

Because the state affirmatively indicated it had no objection, this Court
should affirm the district court's exclusion of the evidence at issue only if
its consideration would have been plain error ..................... 10

2.

Any technical noncompliance with Rule 56(e)'s requirements did not
effect trustworthiness of the documents and the district court abused its
discretion in excluding them .................................. 12

3.

The reports set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence at an
evidentiary hearing .......................................... 13

4.

Conclusion ................................................ 15

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Because He Presented an Issue of Material
Fact as to Whether He Was Entitled to Relief ........................... 15
1.

Applicable standard ......................................... 15

2.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of material fact as to wether he
received effective assistance of counsel .......................... 16
a.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco received ineffective assistance of counsel
due to counsel's failure to fully inform Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the
state's case against him before insisting that he plead guilty .... 17

b.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was constructively denied counsel at the
change of plea and sentencing hearings .................... 21

c.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco received ineffective assistance of counsel
due to trial counsel's failure to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that he
would be inadmissible to the United States and subject to
substantial penalty upon re-entry under federal law .......... 23
i. trial counsel had a duty to advice Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the
potential immigration consequences to his plea ............. 25
ii. the duty of trial counsel to advise regarding immigration
consequences is distinct from any similar duty carried by the trial
court ............................................... 26
iii. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of fact as to whether
he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to advise him regarding
immigration consequences .............................. 27

3.

V.

Conclusion

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea was invalid because it was not
knowing, voluntary and intelligent ............................. 28
........................................................... 30

11

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .............................................................................. 16
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) .......................................................................................... 18
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) ................................................ passim
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ................................................................................ 25
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................................... 16, 24
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ....................................................................... 22, 29
United States v. Delgado-Ramos,, 635 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................... 26, 27
STATE CASES

Aragonv. State, 114Idaho758, 760P.2d 1174(1988) ........................................................ 16, 17
Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836, 907 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1995) .............................................. 9
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 61 P.3d 626 (Ct. App. 2002) ........................................... 15, 16
Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992) 10, 11, 12
Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,201 P.3d 647 (2009) ................................................................ 9
Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,277 P.3d 1050 (Ct. App. 2012) ....................................... 17, 18
Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607, 181 P.3d 533 (Ct. App. 2008) .................................................... 22
Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2005) .............................................. 13
Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 152 P.3d 1237 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................................. 16
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 861 P.2d 1253 (Ct. App. 1993) ................................................... 29
1vfilburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,946 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1997) .................................................. 16
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,971 P.2d 727 (1998) ......................................................... 16, 17

Ill

Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 828 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................................... 16
Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986) ............................................................... 9
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994) ............................................... 10, 12
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1993) .................................................... 16
Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 75 P.3d 180 (2003) ...................................................................... 9
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 92 P.3d 542 (Ct. App. 2004) .................................................... 15
State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976) ..................................................................... 29
State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 21 P.3d 483 (2001) ............................................................. 16, 17
State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530,211 P.3d 775 (Ct. App. 2008) ...................................... 29, 30
State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 156 P.3d 1193 (2007) ............................................................... 29
State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 69 P.3d 1064 (Ct. App. 2003) ................................................. 16
State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 107,897 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1995) .............................................. 29, 30
State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 924 P.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................... 14
Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718, 735 P.2d 1029 (1987) .................................................................. 9
Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64,266 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................................................ 9
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007) ....................................................... 22, 29
FEDERAL STATUTES
8 U.S.C. § 1182 ..................................................................................................................... 23, 25
8 U.S.C. § 1326 ............................................................................................................................. 6
U.S.S.G. § 2Ll .2 .......................................................................................................................... 28

STATE STATUTES
LC.§ 6-1012

............................................................................................................................. 10

IV

I.C. § 6-1013 ................................................................................................................................ 10
LC.§ 19-4906 ......................................................................................................................... 9, 13

V

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Juan ValadezPacheco's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings

The state accused Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of aiding and abetting German in kidnaping and
robbing a man named Dave. See R. 66-67 (Change of Plea ("COP") Tr. p. 20, ln. 16 - p. 21, ln.
6). According to the evidence presented at German's trial, Dave's girlfriend, Wendy, had used
methamphetamine on a daily basis for several years. R. 34 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 296, In. 2 - p. 297,
ln. 6). In 2008, German began fronting her methamphetamine and, by January 2009, she owed
him approximately $2700. R. 32 (Jury Trial Tr. 273-76).
The evening of February 4, 2009, Wendy was at her friend Christine's house with Dave
where they had been smoking methamphetamine. R. 32 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 134, In. 6-22; p. 135,
In. 22 - p. 136, ln. 20). German arrived at the residence with Mr. Valadez-Pacheco as a
passenger and German went to the front door looking for Wendy. R. 17 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 135,
In. 6-16; p. 285, In. 22 - p. 287, In. 3).
Wendy, who was in a back bedroom getting high, asked Dave to tell German that she was
not there. R. 19 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 163, In. 7-23; p. 285, In. 1-21). Dave went to the front door,
stepped outside and told German that Wendy was injail. R. 18 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 139, In. 1-14).
Dave came back inside, threw his beer can away and said he was taking off and Dave left with
German. R. 18 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 139, In. 17-23; p. 287, In. 10-13). According to Dave's trial

testimony, German would not accept Dave's indication that Wendy was not there and demanded
that Dave leave with them while pulling a gun halfway out of his pocket. R. 20 (Jury Trial Tr.
168, ln. 10-25). Dave testified at trial that he got into the back-seat and Mr. Valadez-Pacheco got
in beside him and held a revolver at Dave's side. R. 21 (Jury Trial p. 170, ln. 2 - p. 171, ln. 6).
The police report reflects that Dave said that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was in the front seat.
Dave testified that they drove to some grain silos. R. 21 (Jury Trial p. 172, In. 14-18).
German ordered Dave out of the vehicle with gun in hand, ordered him to put his hands on the
hood and took all his possessions. R. 21 (Jury Trial p. 172, In. 13-25; 173, ln. 2 - 174, ln. 25.
While German took Dave's possessions, Mr. Valadez-Pacheo sat in the vehicle. R. 22 (Jury
Trial p. 176, ln. 7-11 ). German told Dave to get back in and then they drove around until
switching vehicles at a hotel. R. 22 (Jury Trial p. 176, ln. 5-25). German demanded to know
where Wendy's van was and they drove to a pawn shop so German could verify the van was
there. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 177, ln. 10 - p. 178, ln. 13). Dave testified that they drove to Jack in
the Box and purchased food with Dave's money. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 178, ln. 24 - p. 179, ln. 15).
Dave admitted on cross-examination that the drive thru at Jack in the Box was well-lit but he
nonetheless made no attempt to escape. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 179, In. 22 - p. 180, In. 7; p. 198, ln.
11 - p. 200, In. 1).
Dave testified that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not speak English and did not speak. R. 20,
23 (Jury Trial. p. 166, In. 19 - p. 167, In. 2; p. 178, 23-25). Thus, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not
understand what was said between German and Dave. R. 8. Eventually, German was stopped for
speeding. R. 23 (Jury Trial p. 180, In. 23-25). While the officer was speaking with Dave outside
the vehicle, Dave told the officer he was being held against his will. R. 24 (Jury Trial p. 182, In.
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22 - p. 183, In. 15). Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and German were arrested and two firearms were
found during the search of the vehicle. See R. 27 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 210, In. 24 - 212, In. 11).
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and German were charged with robbery and kidnaping in
independent cases. R. 439-40. A jury found German guilty ofrobbery and kidnaping on
September 10, 2009. R. 440. About a week after German's trial, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco pled
guilty to an amended information alleging second degree kidnaping pursuant to a binding plea
agreement. See R. 43-46. In exchange, the state dismissed the robbery charge and a separate
case alleging trafficking in methamphetamine based on drugs found during an investigation
following Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's arrest. R. 43, 122. 1 The agreement provided that Mr. ValadezPacheco would be sentenced to a unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of
confinement of seven and a half years. R. 44. During the change of plea hearing, the following
colloquy between the district court and Mr. Valadez-Pacheco occurred:
District Court:

Are you pleading guilty just to get it over with, even though
you believe you are innocent?
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco: Um, I want to plead guilty because I want to be done with
the case. And If I have to go to prison to pay for my crime,
then so be it.
R. 65 (Change of Plea (COP) Tr. p. 14, In. 16-20). Later, the district court inquired: "And why
did you decide to plead guilty to the charge?" to which Mr. Valadez-Pacheco responded:
"Because I feel like I've participated in taking my ... my friend." R. 65 (COP Tr. 16, In. 16-20).
The district court inquired whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco believed the plea of guilty was in his

According to the police reports attached to the PSI from Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's
underlying criminal case, which was augmented into the appellate record on May 13, 2013,
methamphetamine was found in the vehicle and in German's motel room. Those reports tend to
illustrate that the state's ability to show that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco constructively possessed those
drugs would have been questionable.
1
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best interests to which he responded "Uh. it seems like it is." R. 66 (COP Tr. p. 17, ln. 6-8).
The following exchange then occurred:
District Court:

Will you, then, tell me in your own words what you did to be guilty
of this offense?
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco:! pointed a gun to David Steward.
District Court:
And then did you take David Steward against his will
somewhere?
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco:All I did was point the gun at him. I. ... so he wouldn't
move. That's it.
Defense Counsel:
Your Honor, the evidence essentially is that Mr ValadezPacheco aided and abetted German Guadiana. Mr. Steward
was removed from a residence, kept in a vehicle. The
evidence would come out that Mr. Valadez-Pacheo held
him in the vehicle so he couldn't leave the vehicle, and he
was taken around Elmore County.
District Court:
Do you agree with that description of what occurred, Mr,
Valadez-Pacheco?
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco:Yes, sir.
R. 66-67 (COP Tr. p. 20, ln. 16 - p. 21, ln. 6).
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco retracted his statement that he held a gun to
Dave in the "Defendant's Version" of the offense portion of the Presentence Report ("PSI"). Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco explained as follows:
We went to Christina's house. David came out. I was already in the car sitting in
the back seat. Then David got into the car. He says that I pointed at him with a
firearm. But that is not true and the guns did not have my finger prints on them.
Then we went to Jack in the Box to buy food. Ifhe had been with us against his
will why didn't he make signs or run that is why the prosecutor gave me the deal
of that 7 1/2 in the prison and that is why I took it. Because my friend lost at trial
and I am scared to go for many years at the prison for a crime I didn't commit. I
want to know if they could be a little fair with me please for my mother who is
very sick because she was in an accident and needs me to be in charge of her for
the expenses of the house because my father died and I am the oldest. And also I
don't know English to know what was happening that day. He was drugged and
drunk. Thank you very much.
PSI, p. 4. The pre-sentence investigator further indicated that:
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Mr. Valadez-Pacheco reports Mr. Guadiana and Mr. Steward talked, but he didn't
know what it was about. Mr. Guadiana was looking for Wendy, but Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco claims he does not know why. He saw Mr. Steward exit the
house holding a beer can and he says Mr. Steward had been using
methamphetamine because "they all use drugs."
Asked ifhe knew Mr. Guadiana had a gun, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco replies, "I had
seen German had a gun." He denies seeing the gun the day of the instant offense.
He also denies knowing there was a gun under his seat. He states his friend, Mr.
Guadiana did not sell drugs. Looking back at his actions, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco
writes, "I feel bad because I did not commit this crime that they accuse me of."
He denies being under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Id.
At Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's sentencing hearing, the following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor:

One of the reasons why we set this matter over was the
defendant's version in the PSI was considerably different
than his allocution at entry of plea. And I haven't heard
anything today to say whether he is sticking by his story in
the PSI or is he going back to his version he gave the Court
during allocution at entry of plea because he says he wasn't
involved at all in the PSI. Yet, he told this Court under oath
at his allocution that he in fact held the gun on David
Stewart and helped in the kidnaping and robbery. So I guess
I need to have that clarified prior to going forward today.
District Court:
All right. [Defense Counsel]
Defense Counsel:
Your Honor, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco wishes to maintain his
guilty plea.
District Court:
All right. And is that true, Mr. Valadez?
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco: Yes.
District Court:
Very well then, the Court will note that the defendant had
changed his story at the allocution, entered his guilty plea
based upon the statement of facts. And those statement of
facts are what we are moving forward with.
R. 62, 119 (Sentencing Tr., p. 4, In. 2-25).
The district court followed the plea agreement and sentenced Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to an
unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of confinement of seven and half years. R.
121 (Sentencing Tr., p. 9, In. 13-24).
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Mr. Valadez-Pacheco thereafter pied guilty to illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§
1326(a) and (b)(2) based upon his removal from the United States on about September 1, 2005.
R. 129-131. The United States District Court for the District ofldaho sentenced Mr. ValadezPacheco to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of thirty months concurrent with his
sentence in Elmore County. R. 132.
2.

Post-conviction proceedings

On September 9, 2011, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco filed a prose petition for post-conviction
relief. R. 3. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that trial counsel's "indifferent advice" caused a
manifest injustice upon the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea as he "would not have
agreed to plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" had counsel provided a copy of
translated police reports, discovered the testimony of the state's key witnesses and advised him
on the state's factual and legal burden. R. 4-5. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco attached excerpts from the
transcript prepared from German's jury trial and related police reports, which illustrated that
Dave's trial testimony differed from his initial report to police. The attached excerpts from the
trial also illustrated serious issues regarding the credibility of the state's witnesses, including
their long-term methamphetamine use, their motive to falsely implicate German in order to avoid
the drug debt, the decision not to prosecute Wendy for delivery of methamphetamine in exchange
for her testimony and the incredibility of Dave's story such as his failure to escape while at the
drive thru. R. 5-11, 15-38, 40-41, 48-50, 52. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco also attached a forensic
report indicating that the firearms found in German's vehicle did not have Mr. ValadezPacheco's fingerprints on them. R. 48-50.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he "would have continued to assert his innocence and
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demanded his right to a jury trial had he known, or been adequately advised of all the facts and
the significance of the state's burden to prove their allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 1011. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco also alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. R.
11-12. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco noted that he informed the pre-sentence investigator of his
innocence prior to sentencing but the district court proceeded with sentencing based on the facts
presented at the change of plea hearing. R. 12
On March 12, 2012, appointed counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction
relief, which expressly incorporated the claims raised in the initial petition as well as raising
three additional claims. R. 89. First, the amended petition alleged that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to advise that he would be
inadmissible to the United States and subject to substantial penalty upon re-entry under federal
law as a result of his guilty plea to second degree kidnaping. R. 92. Second, the amended
petition alleged Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was completely denied legal counsel at the change of plea
and sentencing hearings due to trial counsel's insistence that he plead guilty notwithstanding his
continuing assertions of innocence. R. 98. Third, the amended petition alleged that Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea was invalid because it was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
R. 100.
The state moved for summary dismissal. R. 373- 401. At the hearing on the state's
motion, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco asked the district court to consider all the exhibits filed with the
initial and amended petitions. The state indicated that it had no objection and the district court
noted that it believed the exhibits were properly considered. Tr. p. 13, In. 12-17; p. 15, In. 22-23.
However, in its memorandum opinion granting the state's motion for summary dismissal, the
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district court found that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not attest to his personal knowledge of the
documents attached to the initial petition. R. 442. The district court thus concluded that it would
only take judicial notice of the documents which it concluded were subject to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 201, including the excerpts from the transcript of German's jury trial and Mr. ValadezPacheco's change of plea and sentencing hearings. R. 442. The district court further indicated
that it had not considered certain attachments, including the police reports and the Idaho State
Police fingerprint analysis report, because the copies were neither sworn nor certified copies,
were not based upon Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's personal knowledge as required by Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, and contained inadmissible hearsay. R. 442-43. The district court then
concluded that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco failed to present an issue of material fact on any of his
claims and entered judgment on the state's behalf. R. 446-56, 458. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in declining to consider all the exhibits attached to Mr. Valadez-

Pacheco's initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief?
2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's petition for post-

conviction relief because he presented issues of material fact as to whether he was entitled to postconviction relief?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Declining to Consider the Police and
Forensic Reports Attached to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's Initial and Amended Petitions
for Post-Conviction Relief
The district court declined to consider the police reports and ISP forensic report submitted

in support Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's petition for post-conviction relief, finding that the "affidavit
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did not include sworn or certified copies nor state these documents were made based upon the
Petitioner's personal knowledge as required in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56." R. 442.
Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718, 720, 735 P.2d 1029, 1031 (1987); Paradis v. State, 110
Idaho 534,536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Summary dismissal pursuant to LC.§ 19-4906(c) is
the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64,
67,266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836, 837, 907 P.2d 813,
815 (Ct. App. 1995).
Rule 56 provides that affidavits opposing summary judgment:
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith.
I.R.C.P. 56(e). The admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) is a threshold question the trial
court must analyze before applying the rules governing motions for summary judgment. Herrera
v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,680,201 P.3d 647,653 (2009); Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75

P.3d 180, 182 (2003). This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. Id.
Here, at the hearing on the state's summary dismissal motion, the state affirmatively
represented it had no objection to the exhibits at issue and the district court indicated it considered
the exhibits properly considered. Further, the reports were clearly authentic and, thus, that the
copies were not certified or specifically sworn to be true and correct in no way detracted from
their reliability. Finally, the reports were admissible as public records and reports and to establish
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that it would have been rational for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to maintain his not guilty plea and take
the matter to trial had counsel properly advised him of the state's evidence. Accordingly, the
district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the police and forensic reports. 2
1.

Because the state affirmatively indicated it had no objection, this Court
should affirm the district court's exclusion of the evidence at issue only if its
consideration would have been plain error

Our Supreme Court has held that while some form of objection is ordinarily necessary to
preserve the right to challenge the admissibility of evidence under Rule 56( e), neither a motion to
strike nor an objection is required before trial court may exclude evidence offered by a party.
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994); Hecla Mining Co. v.
Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992). However, in
both Rhodehouse and Hecla, the opposing party had expressed some concern with the evidence at
issue which arguably fell short of a proper objection pursuant to Rule 56(e). See Rhodehouse, 125
Idaho at 211, 868 P.2d at 1227 (party only objected to the admissibility of affidavit under LC.§§
6-1012 and-1013 whereas the trial court excluded evidence based on Rule 56(e)); Hecla, 122
Idaho at 782-83, 839 P.2d at 1196-97 (party objected to the consideration of some of the evidence

The district court also refused to consider the audio recording of German's jury trial
attached to the amended petition because it was not an official transcript within the meaning of
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 27(d). R. 442-42. Portions of the official transcript of
German's trial were attached to the initial petition and, thus, post-conviction counsel and the
district court must have known that such a transcript was available. It is unclear why counsel
elected to submit the audio recording in lieu of the full transcript. It is also questionable whether
the district court acted correctly in indicating it would accept all exhibits at the summary
judgment hearing and then excluding the audio recording, at least without simply directing
counsel to submit the full transcript. However, the issue is not raised on appeal because it
appears that the excerpts attached to the initial petition contain the critical information and
establish an issue of fact. The full transcript is obviously available and could be introduced in
the evidentiary hearing on remand.
2
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presented in affidavit but did not file a motion to strike).
In contrast, here, the admissibility of the exhibits was discussed in open court, the district
court expressed no concern with the form of the exhibits and the state expressly indicated it had
no objection to the district court considering the exhibits at issue. At the hearing on the state's
motion for summary dismissal, the district court inquired whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco wished
the court to take "judicial notice" of any documents other than the various transcripts and
documents from the criminal case that had been submitted by the parties. Tr. p. 12, In. 23-25.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco responded that the documents accompanying his petitions were properly

considered. Id. at p. 13, In. 12-17. The district court responded that it considered the verified
petition as part of the pleadings "but for the purposes of making it clear on the record for the
appellate courts of exactly which exhibits I've considered for this purpose. I just want to make
sure it's clear on the record what I am considering." Id. at p. 13, In. 24 - p. 14, In. 5. Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco then clarified that he was asking the district court to consider all the exhibits
filed with the initial and amended petitions. The state indicated it had "no objection to the Court
considering all the exhibits." Id. at 14, In. 22-23. The following exchange then occurred:
District Court: Yeah. These actually were filed in the civil case.
Prosecutor:
Right.
District Court: So I think the case that I cited in my scheduling order is that I can't
go into the underlying criminal file and pull out things, but since
these were filed as part of the pleadings in the civil case, I can
consider them.
Prosecutor:
That's fine. That's just not the state was just using a modicum of
caution. So that's why I sought judicial notice of the items that we
specifically identified. I have no objection to the Court considering
all the exhibits. Ifl was overly cautious, I guess that's okay.
Id. at p. 15, In. 22-23 (emphasis added).
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Thus, not only did the district court represent it could consider the exhibits, the state twice
expressed it had no objection. These circumstances are distinguishable from those in Rhodehouse
and Hecla where the party was alerted to issues with the evidence but the objection fell short of
what would ordinarily be considered adequate to preserve an issue for appellate review.
The Hecla Court also reasoned:
As we have indicated above, some form of objection in the trial court is necessary
to preserve the right to challenge on appeal the admission or consideration of
evidence, unless the error is plain or fundamental. To this extent, we now restrict
our review of the admissibility of evidence under I.R.C.P. 56(e) more strictly than
[it did in another case].
Hecla, 122 Idaho at 785, 839 P.2d at 1199.

Had either the district court or the state expressed concern with the admissibility of the
exhibits, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco would have had the opportunity to present argument in response to
those concerns or to remedy the deficiency. Because there was no objection and Mr. ValadezPacheco was led to believe the district court would consider the exhibits, this Court should only
affirm the exclusion of that evidence if consideration of those documents would have been plain
error.
2.

Any technical noncompliance with Rule 56(e)'s requirements did not effect
trustworthiness of the documents and the district court abused its discretion
in excluding them

The district court concluded that the police and forensic reports did not comply with Rule
56(e) because they were neither sworn or certified copies nor did the affidavit indicate that the
documents were made on Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's personal knowledge. Presumably this defect
would have been remedied if the verified petition had included an indication that the various
attachments represented true and correct copies of the documents received by the defense from the
12

state during discovery. Such a requirement was arguably met by Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's sworn
declaration that "I know the contents [of the verified petition]; and attest that the matters and
allegations contained therein are true." R. 13. With respect to the forensic fingerprint analysis,
the amended petition provided that a "true and correct copy" report was attached as Exhibit 10. R.
97, n.4.
Moreover, there is no question that the documents represent true and accurate copies of
investigative reports involved in this case. As noted by the district court, the reports attached to
the petition were the same as those attached to the PSI, which the district court considered in
summary judgment proceedings. R. 442, n.12. The state very well could have declined to object
to the fact the copies were neither sworn nor certified since it recognized that the exhibits were
accurate copies of the actual reports relevant to this case.
The police and forensic reports attached to the verified petition were plainly accurate
copies of those reports and the state did not object to their admissibility. To exclude the police
and forensic reports because they were neither certified nor sworn in such circumstances is to
exalt form over substance and an abuse of discretion.
3.

The reports set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence at an
evidentiary hearing

The district court also declined to consider the police and forensic reports because they
contained inadmissible hearsay. R. 442. Initially, LC. § 19-4907, which allows a court to receive
proof by affidavits and depositions at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, modifies the rules of
evidence insofar as it permits the admission of certain forms of hearsay that might otherwise be
inadmissible. Lovelandv. State, 141 Idaho 933,936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus,

13

in applying Rule 56(e) in a post-conviction proceeding, affidavits must set forth "facts as would
be admissible in evidence" at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, which may vary from whether
the evidence would be admissible under the rules of evidence.
Further, a police report offered into evidence by a defendant in support of his or her
defense may be admissible under either the business records exception, I.R.E. 803(6), or the
public records exception, I.R.E. 803(8). State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640
(Ct. App. 1996). Rule 803(8) excludes police reports except when offered by an accused in a
criminal case. While the instant proceeding is civil in nature, the reports related to evidence that
was admitted or would have been admissible in a criminal proceeding - a trial against Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco if he had been properly advised and not pied guilty. The forensic police report
is followed by an affidavit which lays a foundation for its admissibility as a public record. See R.
50. The district court abused its discretion in failing to recognize the potential admissibility of the
reports under Rule 803(6) and (8).
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
counsel's failure to review the state's case with him so he could intelligently determine whether to
put the state to its burden of proof. He attached the police and fingerprint reports to illustrate the
discovery and evidence that his attorney should have reviewed with him, including that Dave's
trial testimony differed from his earlier statements to police.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco asserted that trial counsel frightened him into pleading guilty
notwithstanding his continued assertion of innocence because the state's witnesses were credible.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that had he known of Dave's inconsistent statements and other
evidence disclosed in German's trial, including the fingerprint analysis, he would not have pied
14

guilty. The police and forensic reports were admissible as non hearsay and to illustrate the
evidence that would have been submitted in Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's trial had he not pled guilty.
4.

Conclusion

After the state indicated it had no objection to the district court considering the police and
forensic reports attached to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's petition and the district court implied it would
consider those documents, the district court concluded they were inadmissible. The purported
deficiencies in the exhibits - that there were neither certified nor sworn - in no way detracted
from their authenticity and the exhibits set forth facts that would have been admissible in the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in excluding
the police and forensic reports from its consideration of whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented
issues of material fact to support his claims.
B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief Because He Presented an Issue of Material Fact as to
Whether He Was Entitled to Relief
1.

Applicable standard

An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature.

Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,295, 92 P.3d 542,545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a

post-conviction action, either upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the applicant's
favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,272, 61 P. 3d
626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545.
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief action without an evidentiary hearing,
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the appellate court determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,
807, 69 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, the appellate court liberally construes the
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61
P.3d at 629; Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).
2.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of material fact as to whether he
received effective assistance of counsel

The right of a criminal defendant to counsel during trial is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963); Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,652,946 P.2d
71, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the
effective assistance of competent counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

, 130 S.Ct.

14 73, 1480-81 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought
under the post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 795, 152 P.3d 1237,
1243 (Ct. App. 2007); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App.
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail ifhe shows that (1)
counsel's performance was deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277, 971 P.2d 727, 730
(1998); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). As a general matter,
this Court will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and tactical choices. State v.
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Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551, 21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). Nonetheless, this rule does not apply to

counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. The prejudice prong is met when the
defendant shows there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P .2d at 1177; Mitchell,
132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. Where a petitioner alleged a guilty plea was invalid due to trial
counsel's failure to provide sufficient advice, the petitioner can obtain relief by demonstrating that
a decision to not plead guilty would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla,_ U.S.
at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1485; Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,905,277 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Ct. App.
2012).
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
counsel's failure to fully inform Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the state's case
against him before insisting that he plead guilty
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that trial counsel's "indifferent advice" caused a manifest
injustice upon the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea because he "would not have agreed
to plead guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" if counsel had provided a copy of
translated police reports and he had been aware potential testimony of the state's key witnesses.
R. 5. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that trial counsel did not discuss any potential defenses to
the state's case and repeatedly informed him that the state's witnesses were credible and he would
be found guilty following a trial. R. 70. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco attached excerpts of the testimony
of the state's witnesses at German's trial which sets forth their motive to make false allegations in
order to avoid paying the drug debt, their heavy methamphetamine use and Dave's opportunities
to escape. R. 5-10. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's fingerprints were not on the gun found underneath his
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seat.
In dismissing this claim, the district court noted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was advised of
the constitutional rights he waived during the change of plea hearing and that the trial transcripts
and Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's statements during the change of plea hearing described a factual basis
for second-degree kidnaping. However, the longstanding test for determining the validity of a
guilty plea in the context of a ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether the plea represents
a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,905,277 P.3d 1050,
1057 (Ct. App. 2012). The inquiry involving counsel's advice to plead guilty often turns upon the
likelihood that discovery of an overlooked defense or exculpatory evidence would have led
counsel to change his or her recommendation as to the plea or changed counsel's prediction as to
the outcome of a trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60; Hoffman, 153 Idaho at 905,277 P.3d at 1057. A
post-conviction petitioner can obtain relief by demonstrating that a decision to not plead guilty
would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla,_ U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1485;

Hoffman, 153 Idaho at 905,277 P.3d at 1057.
While it is unclear whether trial counsel was aware of the witnesses' testimony at
German's trial, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco clearly alleged counsel failed to discuss that testimony with
him. In either event, a reasonably competent attorney contemplating whether to advise his client
to plead guilty pursuant to an agreement calling for a substantial prison term would discover at
least the critical parts of the trial, either through attendance or review of the audio recording.
Further, the trial testimony suggested heavy methamphetamine use by each of the key
witnesses. See R. 32, 34 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 134, In. 6-22; p. 135, In. 22 - p. 136, In. 20; p. 296, In.
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2 - p. 297, ln. 6). Dave and Wendy admitted that she was avoiding German due to a large drug
debt. R. 31, 32 (Jury Tr. p. 265, ln. 16 - p. 266, ln. 10; p. 274, ln. 15 - p. 275, ln. 24). While both
denied framing German for kidnaping to avoid that debt, the jury reasonably could have
concluded that such the witnesses held such a motive and that their testimony was not credible.

See R. 25, 35 (Jury Tr. p. 197, ln. 21 - p. 198, ln. 6; p. 297, ln. 23 - p. 298, ln. 4). In exchange for
Wendy's testimony, she was not charged for delivering methamphetamine. R. 35 (Jury Trial p.
(Jury Trial Tr. p. 298, ln. 20 - p. 299, ln. 10).
Dave admitted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco did not speak English and thus would not have
been able to understand the communications between Dave and German. See R. 20, 23 (Jury Tr.
p. 166, ln.19 - p. 167, ln. 2; p. 178, ln. 23-25). In an affidavit in support of his post-conviction
petition, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that he had an entirely different focus that eveninggetting German's help to return to Mexico so he could assist his mother who had been critically
injured in a car accident. R. 68-69. As testified to by Dave at German's trial, he had previously
repaired German's vehicle. R. 20 (Jury Trial Tr. p. 166, ln. 19- p. 168, ln. 9). Mr. ValadezPacheco believed German was seeking his assistance with further repairs so the vehicle could be
driven to Arizona. R. 69.
In short, the witness's testimony at German's trial was easily ascertainable prior to Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea and was necessary information for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to make a
knowing and voluntary choice as to whether to plead guilty. That the evidence presented at
German's trial supplied a factual basis for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's guilty as found by the district
court is an entirely different inquiry from whether the state would have been able to convince a
jury of his complicity beyond a reasonable doubt or whether it would have been rational to reject
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the state's plea offer and take the matter to trial.

In response to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's allegation that Dave's trial testimony differed from
his statements to police, the district court found that Dave's statements to police were hearsay if
admitted for their truth and thus it "only considered [them] for the limited purpose as a prior
inconsistent statement which could only be offered" to impeach Dave. R. 447. However, the
ability to impeach Dave was one of the pieces of information that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco indicated
his trial counsel should have informed him about so he could intelligently decide whether to plead
guilty.
The district court also found that Dave's testimony was not mentioned within the portions
of the transcript provided to the court. R. 447. The district court was incorrect. Dave's testimony
at German's trial was attached to the initial petition and appears in the record on appeal at pages
19-24. These excerpts include Dave's testimony that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco "got in the back seat
behind me" whereas the police reports reflects that he told officers that he sat in the front
passenger seat after Mr. Valadez-Pacheco got into the back seat. Compare R. 21 (Jury Trial Tr. p.
170, In. 10-13).
The state's evidence at German's trial and police and forensic reports establish that it
would have been rational for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to reject the state's offer and exercise his right
to trial. He therefore presented an issue of fact as to whether he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
failure to fully apprise him of the state's evidence and the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
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b.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was constructively denied counsel at the change of
plea and sentencing hearings

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he was constructively denied legal counsel at the change
of plea and sentencing hearings due to trial counsel's continued insistence that he admit to
pointing the gun at Dave notwithstanding his continuing assertions of innocence. R. 98-99. Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he repeatedly informed trial counsel that he did not point the gun at
Dave but that trial counsel nonetheless urged Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that he had no alternative but
to falsely admit to doing so and to plead guilty. R. 69-70; 98. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco viewed trial
counsel as a figure of authority and admitted to pointing the firearm at Dave although the
statement was untrue. R. 70, 98-99.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco confided to the presentence investigator that Dave "says that I
pointed at him with a firearm. But that is not true and the guns did not have my finger prints on
them .... I am scared to go for many years to prison for a crime I didn't commit." PSI p. 4. The
investigator did not believe him. Id. at p. 10. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco
acquiesced to his attorney's representation that he wished to "maintain his guilty plea." However,
the district court did not personally examine Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and the desire to stand by his
guilty plea only suggests he did not want the district court to withdraw the plea. Many innocent
defendants have plead guilty - not all of them pursuant to Alford pleas - in order to obtain the
benefit of a plea bargain. In asking the district court to sentence him based on his guilty plea, Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco did not not contradict his statement to the investigator that he did not actually
point the firearm at Dave.
Although post-conviction petitioners are generally required to show prejudice from an
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attorney's deficient performance, certain circumstances "are so likely to prejudice the accused that
the cost oflitigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 525, 164 P.3d 798, 805 (2007) citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,658 (1984). The

Cronic standard applies in the following circumstances: (1) where there is a complete denial of
counsel at a critical stage of trial; (2) where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case
to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) where, "although counsel is available to assist the
accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate. Cronic, 466 U.S. at
659; Workman, 144 Idaho at 525-26, 164 P.3d at 805-06. The second circumstance is at issue
here.
In dismissing this claim, the district court found that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's assertion that
he did not point a gun at Dave was "inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record." R. 454.
At summary dismissal, the applicant's allegations must be accepted as true unless conclusory or
clearly disproved by the record. Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803; Kuehl v. State, 145
Idaho 607, 610, 181 P.3d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 2008).
Unlike some cases where petitioners allege that their sworn statements at a change of plea
hearing are false for the first time in post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained
that his guilty plea was false prior to sentencing. Then, rather than examine Mr. Valadez-Pacheco
regarding the inconsistency, the district court accepted counsel's representation that Mr. ValadezPacheco wished to stand by his guilty plea. As explained above, desiring the court to accept the
plea is entirely different than refuting his claim of innocence. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco informed trial
counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea but his wishes were disregarded and he
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acquiesced to trial counsel's contrary representation. R. 98.
Thus, the record of the criminal proceedings itself is inconsistent and Mr. ValadezPacheco's claim of innocence is not "clearly disproved by the record." There exists an issue of
material fact as to whether trial counsel's conduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Further, as discussed above, the state's evidence against Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was relatively
weak, especially considering the credibility problems of the witnesses, and it would have been
rational for him to take the case to trial. Thus, even if counsel's performance was not sufficiently
egregious to warrant application of the Cronic standard, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco has presented an
issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by trial counsel's insistence that Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco admit to pointing the firearm at Dave notwithstanding his repeated protestations
that he had not done so. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco's petition for post-conviction relief.
c.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial
counsel's failure to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that he would be
inadmissible to the United States and subject to substantial penalty upon
re-entry under federal law

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that trial counsel did not discuss potential immigration
consequences to his plea of second-degree kidnaping and insisted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco admit
holding a gun to Dave although he had not actually done so. R. 92. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco further
alleged that the kidnaping conviction rendered him inadmissible under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act because it constitutes a crime of moral turpitude 8 U.S.C. §
8-l 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). R. 93. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that the kidnaping conviction also
rendered him admissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § l l 82(a)(2)(B) due to a prior conviction in
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Arizona, because the total confinement from his two convictions is greater than five. Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco alleged that he would not have pled guilty and would have taken the case to trial
if he had been aware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held:
Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or
a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We
conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla's
claim.

Padilla, 559 U.S. at_, 130 S.Ct. at 1482.
Further, preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important
to the client than any potential jail sentence. Id. at 1483. The weight of prevailing professional
norms supports that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. Id. at 1482.
Accordingly, the Court defined counsel's duty to advise clients regarding immigration
consequences as follows:
When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is
equally clear.

Id. at 1483. "It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice
about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so 'clearly satisfies the first prong of the

Strickland analysis."' Id. at 1484, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 4 74 U.S. 52, 62 ( 1985) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment). To obtain relief, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla, 559 U.S. at
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_ , 130 S.Ct. at 1485; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480 (2000).
Trial counsel had a duty to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco that his plea to second-degree
kidnaping would potentially be considered a crime of moral turpitude and that a second conviction
that resulted in a total period of confinement of more than five years would render him
inadmissible. Given the potential defenses available to Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and the credibility
issues with the state's witnesses, it would have been rational for him to reject the state's plea offer
had he received such advice.

i.

trial counsel had a duty to advice Mr. Valadez-Pacheco ofthe
potential immigration consequences to his plea

In dismissing Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim, the district court indicated that "although the
First Amended Petition reaches many legal conclusions about a conviction of second degree
kidnapping [being] a crime of moral turpitude, the court is not to consider matters outside the
personal knowledge of an affiant or conclusions of law." R. 451. However, the referenced
portions of the petition cite to the Immigration and Nationality Act and are not the type of
"conclusions of law" that do not create an issue of material fact.
As cited by Mr. Valadez-Pacheco in his amended petition, any alien convicted of "a crime
involving moral turpitude ... is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Additionally, "any
alien convicted of 2 or more offenses ... for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5
years or more is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(B). Unlike an unsupported legal
conclusion such as "counsel was ineffective," the foregoing establish the legal standards against
which trial counsel's failure to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of immigration consequences is
judged and the district court should not have disregarded them as unsupported legal conclusions.
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Moreover, "certain categories of crimes are easily classified as involving moral turpitude,
such as those with an element of fraud or those that involve a certain degree of "baseness or
depravity," such as murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, abuse, or some forms of aggravated
assault. Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513,519 (6th Cir. 2012). While the Ninth Circuit has
recently held that simple kidnaping under California law is not categorically a crime of moral
turpitude, immigration can conclude that a defendant's conduct meets the generic definition of
that offense pursuant to the modified categorical approach Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d
1205, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013).
Trial counsel had an obligation to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the potential
immigration consequences of the plea arrangement. While the immigration consequences of the
second-degree kidnaping conviction are not as clear as the drug offense at issue in Padilla,
kidnaping clearly risks being classified as a crime of moral turpitude and trial counsel had
obligation to so advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco. Such advise would have enabled Mr. ValadezPacheco to further discuss the possibilities with an immigration attorney and to attempt to
minimize immigration consequences through plea negotiations. Fully advised of his options, Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco would have been armed with the information necessary to make a knowing and
intelligent choice as to whether to accept a plea bargain or put the state to its burden of proof at
trial.

ii.

the duty of trial counsel to advise regarding immigration
consequences is distinct from any similar duty carried by the trial
court

The district court noted that the judge advised Mr. Valadez-Pacheco there could be
immigration consequences to his plea. R. 452. Then, citing to United States v. Delgado-Ramos,
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635 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2011), the district court concluded that neither the court nor counsel
had a duty to advise him further, especially since his deportation is collateral to his conviction. Id.
However, the Delgado-Ramos Court addressed the court's obligation to inform a defendant of
immigration consequences prior to accepting a guilty plea and did not address counsel's obligation
to provide such advice under the Sixth Amendment. The Court noted that:
Because the defendant in Padilla raised only a Sixth Amendment claim, the Court had
no occasion to consider the scope of a district court's obligation under Rule 11,
whether a defendant's due process rights are violated if the court fails to inform him
of the immigration consequences of his plea, or the continued viability of the
distinction between direct and collateral consequences in the due process context.
The Court thus concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent holding that due process does not require a
court to inform defendants of collateral consequences prior to entering a plea survived the Padilla
decision.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim alleges a Sixth Amendment violation based on counsel's failure
to advise him regarding immigration consequences and Delgado-Ramos has no bearing on this case
Further, the district court's advisory that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's plea of guilty could" result in your
deportation, with the inability to obtain legal status or denial of an application for United States
citizenship" [R. 64 (COP Tr. p. 12, ln. 4-9)] did not substitute effective advice from counsel regarding
the potential immigration consequences particular to his case.
iii.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue offact as to whether he was
prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to advise him regarding
immigration consequences

The district court noted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco had been deported for a prior drug
conviction, immigration placed a detainer on that basis prior to his kidnaping plea and he later pled
guilty to illegal re-entry. R. 451-52. Although Mr. Valadez-Pacheco would have been deported
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irrespective of his kidnaping plea, it remains unclear whether the kidnaping plea impacts his future
ability to gain admission to the United States. Should he enter without permission, the kidnaping plea

will greatly enhance his punishment if convicted ofillegal re-entry. See U.S.S.G. § 2Ll .2(b)(I)(A)(ii).
Thus, while Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's immigration status irrespective of the kidnaping plea are relevant
to whether Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to advise him regarding
immigration consequences, they do not preclude an issue of material fact and the district court should
have granted an evidentiary hearing.
Trial counsel was obligated to advise Mr. Valadez-Pacheco of the potential immigration
consequence of his guilty plea. Further, as discussed further below, there were serious credibility
issues with the state's witnesses and particularly in light of Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's inability to
communicate in English, reasonable doubt concerning Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's knowledge of what
was occurring and the role he was playing. It would have been rational for Mr. Valadez-Pacheco to
reject the plea bargain and take the matter to trial. There is an issue of fact as to whether Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to inform ofthe immigration consequences
to his guilty plea.
3.

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's guilty plea was invalid because it was not knowing,
voluntary and intelligent

Mr. Valadez-Pacheco alleged that his guilty plea was invalid because it was neither knowing,
voluntary nor intelligent. R. 100, see also R. 11-12. Specifically, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained
that each time he met with trial counsel, he informed counsel that he was factually innocent. R. 100.
Trial counsel nevertheless failed to discuss trial strategy with Mr. Valadez-Pacheco and, instead,
simply insisted he plead guilty because he would lose at trial and be sentenced to a lengthy period of
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incarceration. R. 101. At the change of plea hearing, trial counsel insisted that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco
indicate he had pointed the gun at Dave when in fact Mr. Valadez-Pacheco had not done so. R. 92,
98. Mr. Valadez-Pacheco was raised to submit to figures of authority and he viewed trial counsel as
a figure of authority. R. 101. Thus, despite his continued assertions of his factual innocence, Mr.
Valadez-Pacheco pled guilty based solely upon trial counsel's insistence and faulty advice. R. 101.
The district court analyzed Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim that his guilty plea was invalid in
conjunction with its analysis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 453. However,
the standard to evaluate a claim that a plea was involuntary is distinct from that applied to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
An allegation that a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary raises a constitutional
challenge to the conviction which may be asserted in a post conviction proceeding. Mata v. State,
124 Idaho 588, 593-94, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258-59 (Ct. App. 1993). For a guilty plea to be valid, the
entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
manner. Workman, 144 Idaho at 527, 164 P.3d at 807; State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d
1193, 1194 (2007). Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1)
whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges
and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury
trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer,
98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976).
A plea of guilty is deemed coerced where it is improperly induced by ignorance, fear or fraud.

State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530,537,211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Spry, 127 Idaho
107,110,897 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1995); Mata, 124 Idaho at 594, 861 P.2d at 1259. If an
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innocent person would have felt compelled to plead guilty in light of the circumstances, it can
properly be said that the plea was involuntary. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537,211 P.3d at 782; Spry,
127 Idaho at 110-11, 897 P.2d at 1005-06.
As noted above, the district court found that Mr. Valadez-Pacheco's claim that he did not
point a gun at Dave was "inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record." R. 454. However,
as discussed above, Mr. Valadez-Pacheco explained that his guilty plea was false prior to sentencing
In light of the supporting allegations explaining the pressure trial counsel exerted over Mr. ValadezPacheco, his assertion of innocence is not conclusively disproved by the record.
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco presented an issue of fact as to whether his guilty plea was improperly
induced by ignorance and fear. Accordingly, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief.

V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Valadez-Pacheco respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment
dismissing his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings.
·'1
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